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1 .  Introduction 
This paper presents Discourse Adjectives, a natural class of predicate whose 
members include apparent, evident, clear, and obvious, in their use as 
propositional modifiers in sentences such as those in ( 1 ) . 
( 1 )  a .  It is apparent that somebody committed a crime. 
b.  It is evident that the police are on their way. 
c. It is  clear that Briscoe is a detective. 
d. It is obvious that someone watches way too much Law & Order. 
The main claim is that Discourse Adjectives mean in an interesting and important 
way: their use is entirely metaliguistic .  They offer interlocutors a way to talk 
about their conversation, rather than talking about their world. As such, they 
appear to violate a commonly held constraint on assertions :  they do not appear to 
add new information to the common ground of a discourse. This is  interesting 
because Discourse Adjectives represent the first identified c lass of lexical 
predicates whose use is entirely metalinguistic .  Without minor modifications, 
previous semantic models cannot account for their semantics. In particular, any 
analysis will need to combine a finely articulated representation of the common 
ground with a mechanism for acknowledging degrees of probabi lity. 
2. Discourse Adjectives are "Factive Impostors" 
An initial exploration of the semantics of Discourse Adjecti ves might hypothesize 
that they' re facti ve, in the sense of Kiparsky and Kiparsky ( 1 970). Consider (2). 
(2) It is  clear that Briscoe is a detective. 
Example (2) seems to entai l that Briscoe is a detecti ve . However, standard 
diagnostics for factivity show that predications of c larity do not entail the truth of 
their complement propositions. The truth of the complement is not an entai lment 
under either negation or questioning, as shown in (3). 
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a. It i sn ' t  clear that Briscoe is a detective, which makes sense, since he' s 
not a detecti ve. 
b. Is i t  clear that Briscoe is a detective? 
(3a) is not contradictory, and (3b) is indetenninate between a reading in 
which the speaker questions Briscoe's  detectivehood, and one in which she 
wonders whether this proposition is 'clear' to the addressee. In spite of the fact 
that Discourse Adjectives fail the two standard diagnostics for factivity, it is hard 
to deny the strong flavor of factivity that sentence (2) carries. That is, i t  really 
feels like it is clear that Briscoe is a detective entails that Briscoe is a detective. 
3. A Case Study of the Semantics of Clear 
3. 1 .  The Paradox of Asserting Clarity 
The starting point for an analysis of clear is a quick review the Paradox of 
Asserting Clarity, first introduced in Barker and Taranto (2002) .  The dilemma 
that underpins the paradox arises from the standard assumption in (4), that an 
assertion is  felicitous only if it adds new information to the common ground. 
After all ,  what use could it be to claim that a proposition is true if it is already 
accepted as true? The answer advocated by Barker and Taranto is given in (5) .  
(4) Informativeness Constraint on Assertions 
An assertion is felicitous only if it adds new information to the common 
ground. (after Stalnaker 1979 :325, van der Sandt 1 992:367) 
(5) Some sentences can have side-effects besides adding new information 
about the world to the common ground, and it can be worth asserting a 
sentence entirely for the sake of these side-effects. (Following Beaver 
(2002» 
Returning to the central example for this paper, the sentence in (2), the 
observation is that intuitively, if (2) is true, then before it  is uttered, the speaker 
and the addressee must already believe that Briscoe is a detective: if either is not 
already convinced that Briscoe is a detective, then it isn ' t  clear at all . But, if it 
was already evident that Briscoe is a detective, then asserting (2) adds no new 
information to the context, contra the assumption spelled out in the 
Informativeness Constraint in (4) .  This leads to Lemma 1 ,  elaborated in (6). 
(6) Lemma 1 
If (2) is true, it adds no new information to the context, so why bother to 
assert it? 
!. ' .  
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Lemma I could be resolved by showing that an utterance of (2) does add 
new information to the common ground namely, the information that Briscoe is a 
detective. However, this would give rise to Lemma 2, which is elaborated in (7). 
(7) Lemma 2 
Assume (2) entai ls Briscoe is a detective. If the speaker has decided that 
Briscoe is a detective on the basis of information shared by the speaker 
and addressee, then (2) only adds information if the speaker assumes that 
the addressee has not come to the same conclusion,  in which case it is not 
in fact c lear that Briscoe is  a detective, otherwise the addressee would 
have realized it  on her own. 
In other words, perhaps (2) can only be used in situations in which the 
addressee is an idiot:  she has all the evidence she needs to real ize that Briscoe is a 
detective, but she fails to take that last logical step. To consider such a situation, 
assume that the propositions in (8) are true, Briscoe, who works for the NYPD 
detective division ,  is walking alongside Detective Logan , and he' s waving his 
pistol , badge, and magnifying glass. 
(8) a. Briscoe works for the NYPD detective di vision . 
b .  Briscoe ' s  partner is a detective, Detective Logan . 
c .  Bri scoe carries a pistol and magnifying glass wherever he goes. 
d. Briscoe carries a detective' s  badge. 
To be even more explicit, imagine that the sentences in (8) have just been 
uttered by B. That ' s  when A replies with her own version of (2) , an utterance of 
the sentence in (9). 
(9) Clearly you fool , Briscoe is a detective ! 
3.2. The Framework - Gunlogson (2001) 
The starting point for the formalization of the proposed analysis of the 
semantics of clear is Gunlogson ' s  adaptation of a Standard Stalnakerian Model .  
Some of the key points of this model are outlined in ( 1 0) . 
( 10) Gunlogson ' s  Adaptation of The Standard Model 
a. Within the Common Ground a distinction is made between the 
Discourse Commitments of the speaker and the addressee. 
b. An indi vidual ' s  Discourse Commitments are identified with that 
individual ' s  public beliefs .  
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c. The Context Set of a Discourse with two participants A and B 
(CSA,B) is an ordered pair of sets of the discourse commitments of A 
and B :  the commitment set of A (CSA) includes the worlds of which 
A's public beliefs are true; the commitment set of B (CSB) includes the 
worlds of which B ' s  public beliefs are true. 
d. Asserting a sentence S: remove al l worlds from the commitment set of 
the speaker in which S is not true. 
Points in ( l Oa through c) establish that the common ground of a discourse 
is construed as the individual sets of possible worlds corresponding to the way the 
discourse participants individual ly believe the world might be. Point ( lOd) 
explains that when a sentence is asserted the common ground is updated by 
removing from the speaker' s commitment set all of the worlds in which the 
proposition expressed by the sentence is not true. An example of the affect of an 
utterance of Briscoe is a detective is provided in ( 1 2) .  The model of possible 
worlds under consideration is  in ( 1 1 ) .  Odd numbered worlds are worlds in which 
Briscoe is a detective, and this i s  emphasized with bold-type. Even numbered 
worlds are worlds in which Briscoe is not a detective. 
( 1 1 )  Model of Possible Worlds 
W9 = Briscoe is a detective 
W I O  = Briscoe is not a detective 
W n = Briscoe is a detective 
W1 2  = Briscoe is not a detective 
( 1 2) CSA 
a. Input Context C 
{ W9, WI O, Wn ,  W1 2  } 
b. C + [ Briscoe is a detective] 
{ W9, Wn ,  } 
CSB 
The context depicted in ( l 2a) is neutral toward the proposition expressed 
by Briscoe is a detective. The individual commitment sets of both participants 
incl ude worlds in which Briscoe is, as well as worlds in which Briscoe is  not, a 
detective. Update with A's  assertion of Briscoe is a detective removes worlds 1 0  
and 1 2, worlds i n  which Briscoe i s  not a detective, from A ' s  i ndi vidual 
commitment set. The resulting context in ( l 2b) is a context that is biased toward 
the truth of the proposition expressed by Briscoe is a detective, since it i s  a public 
commitment of A, but not B,  in line with the definition in ( 1 4) .  Gunlogson ' s  
definitions for bias and neutrality are provided i n  ( 1 3) and ( 14). 
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( 13) C is biased toward p iff P is a public commitment of exactly one discourse 
participant. 
( 14) C is neutral toward p iff neither discourse participant is committed to 
ei ther p or W-p. 
3.3. Resolving the Paradox 
With the basics of Gunlogson' s  adaptation of a standard Stalnakerian 
model established, it is possible to continue an analysis of the semantics of clear 
by picking up with the with the observation that Discourse Adjectives aren' t  
facti ve. The proposed analysis respects the fact that there are a number of 
possibi lities for the way the world might be, and that these are ordered in terms of 
their plausibi lity. For instance, regarding the proposition that Bri scoe is  a 
detective, in any given world the possible explanations might include that Briscoe 
is a detective, as in world nine, or that he ' s  not a real detective, he' s  getting 
dressed up for a Halloween party, or perhaps even the more unlikely alternative in 
world twelve, that Briscoe is  not a detective at all ,  but the CIA wants us to believe 
that he is .  
( 1 5)  Possible explanations for the evidence suggesting that Briscoe is  a 
detective, from most to least l ikely: 
W9 = Briscoe is a detective. 
WlO = Briscoe isn ' t  a real detective, he' s  getting ready for a Halloween 
party. 
W l l  = The pistol and magnifying glass belong to Briscoe's brother, but 
coincidentally Briscoe is a detective, too. 
W l 2 = Bri scoe isn ' t  a detective, but the CIA wants us to believe that he is .  
Nothing in the sentences in (8) rules out any of the possible worlds given 
in ( 1 5) . But because in some of these worlds Briscoe isn ' t  a detective, update 
with sentence (2), it is clear that Briscoe is a detective will  at least eliminate those 
worlds in which Briscoe isn ' t  a detective. This result is  suspicious, since s imply 
asserting that Briscoe is a detective will achieve the same result. This leads to the 
fol lowing question : why not just assert that Bri scoe is  a detecti ve, why ever assert 
that it' s clear that Briscoe is a detective? At thi s point it should be clear why a 
speaker might be reluctant to assert that Briscoe i s  a detecti ve: because Briscoe 
might not be a detective - there are other l ive possibilities. 
S ince it i s  known from Grice that it i s  uncooperati ve to assert something 
for which one lacks sufficient evidence, i t  would be uncooperative to claim that 
Briscoe is a detective unless one was absolutely certain .  If thi s thinking is on the 
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right track, the conclusion is that clarity i s  asserted only in contexts in which there 
is some lingering uncertainty that the complement is in fact true. However, if thi s  
is  right, i t  leads t o  a new problem: the original paradox has been reconstructed, 
only in reverse. The reconstructed paradox is given in ( 1 6) .  
( 1 6) The Reconstructed Paradox 
It is clear that p is only asserted in situations in which it is in fact not clear 
that p !  
The key t o  resolving thi s  paradox depends on appreclatmg how the 
grammar deals with degrees of probabi lity. In other words, the appropriateness of 
asserting clarity depends on the degrees of probability of different explanations for 
the facts. Situations in which the applicability of a predicate depends on degrees 
are well known in the literature: what we're dealing with here is vagueness, or the 
observation that in a given situation, i t 's  not always clear how clear a proposition 
needs to be to count as clear. 
3.3. 1 .  Vagueness (Fine 1975, Williamson 1994, 1999, Kennedy 1997) 
Fol lowing Barker (2002),  and Barker and Taranto (2002) the proposed analysis 
makes use of a delineation function that takes a situation and an adjective 
meaning, and returns the vague standard for the adjective in the given situation. 
This is written as in ( 1 7). 
( 1 7) d(c)( [ clear ] )  
d :  delineation function (Lewis 1 970) : takes a situation c and an adjective 
meaning and returns the vague standard for that adjective in the given 
situation . 
The idea is that different possible worlds may differ preci sely in the 
standard they impose on a vague adjective. So in one world the absolute standard 
may be set higher or lower than it is in another world. By using a mechanism that 
al lows for a representation of the vagueness inherent in predications of clarity, the 
truth conditions of ( 1 8a) That Briscoe is a detective is clear can be characterized 
as in ( 1 8b). 
( 1 8) a. That Briscoe is a detective is clear. 
b. The maximal degree to which the proposition expressed by Briscoe is 
a detective is clear is at least as great as d( c)( [ clear ] )  
( 1 8b) merely states that the maximal degree to which the proPOSItIon 
expressed by Briscoe is a detective is clear is  at least as great as the value returned 
by the del ineation function . The only information provided by an utterance of 
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( 1 8a) regards the prevai ling standard for clarity. That is,  information is provided 
about the state of the discourse, but no new information is provided about the 
facts of the world. 
It i s  easy to model the use of vague predicates in a Stalnakerian model of 
context-update if as long as a few natural assumptions are made. The necessary 
assumptions are outlined in ( 1 9). 
( 1 9) During a conversation, one thing is certain about the world; that a 
conversation is taking place, that the speaker is speaking, that the hearer is  
being addressed, and so on.  Therefore every possible world in the initial 
context will be a world in which the conversation underway is taking 
place. 
When the assumptions in ( 1 9) are incorporated with what is known about 
vague predicates the result is the observation in (20) : that worlds in a context may 
vary with respect to the values assigned by delineation functions .  
(20) One way in which the worlds in a context may vary is in the value of their 
delineation function for the version of the conversation in that world. 
Based on the assumptions of ( 19) and (20), a first attempt at an analysis of 
clear is presented in (2 1 ) . 
(2 1 )  csx + [ it is clear that p ]  = { W E  cSx : the maximal degree to which p is 
l ikely to be true in cSx i s  at least as great as d(c)([ clear ] ) in w } [to be 
revi sed in (24)] 
The proposal in (2 1 )  claims that updating the commitment set of a 
discourse participant x with the information expressed by it is clear that p wil l  
yield a set o f  worlds i n  which the maximal degree to which p i s  likely t o  be true i n  
x 's commitment set i s  a s  least as great a s  the delineation function requires in that 
world. This analysi s  captures the connection between likelihood and clarity, and 
specifies the respect in which asserting clarity is similar to asserting the 
applicabi l ity of a vague predicate. However, i t  cannot be right. 
The problem is that in Gunlogson ' s  model (as wel l as other Stalnakerian 
models), propositions don ' t  have probabilities. For any gi ven possible world, 
either Briscoe is a detective, or he 's  not. No matter what the standard for c larity 
is,  worlds in which the probability is 1 will survive update according to (2 1 ), and 
worlds in which the probabil i ty is  0 wil l  not. Thus, in  the absence of 
acknowledging probabil ity, the meaning of it is clear that Briscoe is a detective i s  
identical to the meaning o f  Briscoe is a detective, which has already been shown 
to be incorrect. 
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3.4. The Solution 
This problem raised by the analysis in (2 1 )  can be solved by building on the 
observation that likelihood is a judgment made by some sentient creature who is 
contemplating p. Therefore, if likelihood plays a role in assertions of clarity, we 
need to figure out who is judging likelihood. An important clue to the identity of 
the experiencers of clarity comes from comparing a simple assertion of clari ty to 
one in which the experiencer is overt. Consider the data in (22). 
(22) a. It is clear that Briscoe is a detecti ve. 
ASSERTION OF SIMPLE CLARITY 
b. It is clear to me that Briscoe is a detective. 
ASSERTION OF PERSONAL CLARITY 
c. (Surely) It is clear to you that Briscoe is a detective. 
ASSERTION OF PERSONAL CLARITY 
In the revised analysis, the meaning of (22a) is approximated as the 
conjunction of (22b and c):  if it is clear that Bri scoe is a detective, then it is clear 
to the discourse participants that Briscoe is a detective. This suggests refining the 
context change potential in (2 1 )  as in (23), which considers j udgments of 
l ikelihood at each world. So (23) recognizes that belief is a gradient attitude, and 
behaves just like any other vague predicate. 
(23) csx + [ it is clear that p ] = ( W E cSx : the maximal degree to which the 
counterpart of x judges that p is likely to be true in cSx is at least as great as 
d(c)( [ clear] ) in w }  
In practical terms, this means that i f  a speaker asserts (24a) it is clear to 
me that Briscoe is a detective with the semantics in (24b), then only those worlds 
wi l l  survive update at which the speaker believes that Briscoe is a detective. 
(24) a. It is clear to me that Briscoe is a detective. 
b. ( w  such that believe(w)(d,speaker,Briscoe-is-a-detective) � 
d(c)( [clear] ) }  
Worlds that are excluded will include worlds i n  which there i s  enough 
uncertainty to reduce the speaker' s belief of Briscoe' s  detectivehood to below that 
world ' s  specified threshold for clarity. Worlds may survive in which Briscoe i s  
not a detective, a s  long a s  the speaker believes that Briscoe is a detective in  that 
world. 
An example is provided in (26), which includes information about 
Briscoe' s  being a detective, as well as information about the clarity of thi s 
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proposItIOn in terms of the discourse participant 's  beliefs.  In (25), "D" 
abbreviates the proposition expressed by Briscoe is a detective, and "Bel" is a 
bel ief operator used to indicate whether A or B believe that Briscoe is a detective. 
In (25), world nine is a world in which both A and B believe Briscoe is a 
detecti ve, and world ten is a world in which neither A nor B believe that Briscoe 
is a detecti ve. 
(25) Expanded Model of possible worlds 
W9 = Briscoe is a detective 
W I O  = Briscoe is not a detective 
(Halloween Pany) 
WI I  = Briscoe is a detective 
W I 2  = Briscoe is not a detective 
(CIA plot) 
Bel(A,D) Bel(B,D)  
...,Bel (A,D) ...,Bel (B ,D) 
Bel(A,D) ...,Bel (B,D) 
Bel(A,D) ...,Bel (B,D) 
Imagine a situation in which the speaker, A, i s  unaware of the CIA plot; 
her utterance of (24a) i s  modeled in (26). The input context is  as modeled in 
(26a), and the result of her utterance eliminates world ten - the world in which A 
does not believe Briscoe is a detective - from her commitment set. Her 
commitment set stil l  includes world twelve, a world in which Briscoe i sn ' t  a 
detective, but because in this world there is sufficient evidence to persuade our 
speaker that Briscoe is a detective, this world remains a live possibility. 
(26) 
a. Input Context C 
b. C + A: [ (26a) ] 
CSA 
{ W9, WIO, W H , W I 2  } 
{ W9, W H , WI2  } 
C S B  
{ W9, W I O, W U , W I 2  } 
{ W9, W I O, W H , W I 2  } 
In a departure from Gunlogson (which will be addressed below), the 
analysi s of clear presented here adopts Walker's Collaborative principle, shown in 
(27), which holds that conversants must provide evidence of discrepancy in belief 
as soon as possible. 
(27) Collaborative Principle (Walker 1 992) 
Conversants must provide evidence of a discrepancy in belief as soon as 
possible. 
The claim made here about the semantics of clear i s  that in the normal 
course of events, when A utters it is clear to me that Briscoe is a detective, B wil l  
have no choice but to accept the fact that i t  is clear to A - A is the highest 
authority on A's beliefs. By brining in Walker' s Collaborative Principle, it is 
possible to formalize what happens if B does not immediately express doubt about 
the truth or sincerity of A 's  statement. If B remains silent, then the di scourse 
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model wil l  reflect individual public commitments on the part of both A and B to 
A's belief in Briscoe's  detectivehood. Thus, the representation of B ' s  
commitment set as depicted i n  (26b) i s  incomplete - B ' s  commitment set must 
also reflect her belief (- or acquiescence -) to A ' s  commitment to the clarity of the 
proposition expressed by Briscoe is a detective, as shown in (28) .  
(28) CSA CSB 
a. Input Context C { W" WIO, W l l ,  W I 2  } { W" W I O, W l l ,  W I 2  } 
b. C + A: [ (26a) ] { W" W l l ,  W I 2  } { W" W I O, Wl l ,  WI2  } 
c.  No objection from { W" W l l ,  W I 2  } { W" W l l ,  WI2  } 
Note that the commitment set of B in (28c) includes two worlds in which 
it is not clear to B that Briscoe is a detective - Her commitment set includes 
worlds eleven and world twelve, worlds in which it  i s  clear to A that Briscoe is a 
detecti ve, even though it is not clear to B that Briscoe i s  a detective. 
Example (29) shows the update effect of an assertion of simple clarity. 
(29) It is clear that Briscoe is a detective. 
(30) 
a. Input Context C 
b. C + A: "(3 1 )" 
{ W" WIO, W l l , W I 2 } 
{ w, } 
c. No objection from B { w, } 
CSB 
{ W" W I O, Wl l , WI 2  } 
{ W" WI O, Wl l , WI 2  } 
{ w, } 
Since the semantics of clear specify that the default interpretation of the 
experiencer is as the Discourse Participants, the only world that survives update is 
world nine, the sole world in which it is  clear to both A and B that Briscoe is a 
detecti ve. By this analysis dialogs involving the denial of simple assertions 
involve contradiction and repair, while denials of assertions of personal clarity do 
not. Consider (3 1 ) .  
(3 1 )  Denial o f  simple assertions involve contradiction and repair 
A: Briscoe is a detective. 
B: Actually, Briscoe isn ' t  a detective. I just asked him and he proved 
he' s not. 
In (3 1 ) ,  a dialog in which A utters "Briscoe is a detective", and B replies 
"Actual ly, he' s  not a detective. I just asked him and he proved he' s  not" B ' s  
statement contradicts A's. Presumably, some form of repair must occur before 
the conversation can proceed. In contrast, the dialog in (32) includes A ' s  
assertion of  personal clarity. 
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(32)  Denial of  assertions of  personal clarity do not involve contradiction 
A: It is clear to me that Briscoe is a detective. 
B: Actual ly, Briscoe isn ' t  a detective. I happen to be a CIA operati ve, 
and I can tell you that i t ' s  all part of a supremely devious charade. 
When A utters "It is clear to me that Briscoe is a detective" , and B 
responds "Actually, Briscoe isn ' t  a detective. I happen to be a CIA operative, and 
I can tell you that i t  is all part of a supremely devious charade",  B has not 
contradicted A: i t  remains true that i t  was clear to A that Briscoe was a detecti ve. 
Whether or not A will continue to believe in Briscoe ' s  detectivehood will  depend 
on her belief in the truth of B' s statement. 
3. 4. 1 .  Explaining "Factive Impostors" 
It i s  now possible to explain the status of Discourse Adjectives as "Factive 
Impostors". That is, i t  is possible to explain the observation made in the 
introduction that in spite of the fact that Discourse Adjectives fai l the standard 
diagnostics for factivity, they intuitively "feel" very factive. The explanation 
avai lable given the analysis presented here is  that in the absence of an overt 
experiencer, the entities doing the experiencing default to the speaker and 
addressee. The semantics of simple clarity guarantee that in the absence of an 
immediate and overt objection by the addressee, every world in the updated 
context will be a world in which the experiencer - in this case, both the speaker 
and the addressee - believes the truth of the proposition. The result is that, in  
terms of the model relevant to a particular discourse, the discourse participants 
believe the proposition is l ikely to be true in every world in the updated context. 
As spelled out in  (33), asserting It is clear that p does not entai l p, but i t  
guarantees that the discourse participants are justified in behaving a s  i f  p i s  true.  
(33) • In the absence of an overt experiencer, the enti ties doing the 
believing default to both the speaker and the addressee. 
• The semantics of clarity guarantee that every world in the updated 
context will be a world in which the experiencer bel ieves the truth of 
the proposition . 
• The result is that all of the discourse participants believe the truth of 
the proposition in every world in the updated context. 
The key thing to note is that asserting clarity is  purely about the judgment 
of the discourse participants, and not about what is the case in any part of the 
world under discussion . This is precisely how asserting clarity synchronizes the 
common ground: it forces the speaker and addressee to acknowledge that they are 
in a position to treat a certain proposi tion as if i t  were a fact .  
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(34) Utterances with Discourse Adjectives can help to synchronize the Context 
Set of a discourse by elevating the shared private beliefs of the discourse 
participants to the status of mutual public beliefs .  
This  explanation of Factive Impostors provides a resolution to Lemma 2 -
an assertion of personal clarity doesn ' t  require that the speaker believes the 
addressee is  an idiot, it merely requires that she believes a private belief is shared, 
and could be made public .  
(35) Resolution of Lemma 2 
Isn ' t  asserting clarity tantamount to suggesting that the hearer is an idiot? 
Resolution : It is sufficient for the speaker to assume that the addressee 
may not know that the speaker also believes that Briscoe is a detective. 
As for Lemma 1 ,  if  asserting clarity adds no new information about the 
si tuation under discussion, what use is i t  to assert it .  The resolution is that 
information is added. The new information regards the attitude of the discourse 
participants towards the proposition in question. 
(36) Resolution of Lemma 1 
If asserting clarity adds no new information about the situation under 
discussion, what use is it to assert it? 
Resolution : information is added about the attitude of the discourse 
participants . 
As for the reconstructed paradox, that it is clear that p i s  asserted only in 
situations in which i t  i s  in fact not clear that p, the resolution comes from the 
understanding that asserting clarity does not require asserting perfect clarity. By 
recognizing the role of vagueness, it is possible to capture how asserting clarity 
means that the proposition in question is merely clear enough - in particular, we 
see that asserting clarity means that the proposition is clear enough to proceed as 
i f  it were true. 
(37) Resolution of The Reconstructed Paradox 
It is clear that p is only asserted in situations in which it is in fact not clear 
that p. 
4. Notes on the Implementation of Gunlogson: Degrees of Commitment 
The final section of thi s  paper will briefly discuss a consequence of updating 
Gunlogson ' s  model with degrees. This modification provides a means to 
represent degrees of public commitment to a proposition , which is good, since a 
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comparison across the class of Discourse Adjective reveals that an individual ' s  
degree of publ ic commitment toward a proposition can be vague. 
Consider the sentences in (38), as possibly uttered by Bri scoe upon his  
arrival and brief survey of the scene of the crime. 
(38) a. It i s  apparent that Mr. Body was murdered in the conservatory with 
the candlestick. 
b .  It is evident that Mr. Body was murdered in the conservatory with 
the candlestick. 
c. It is c lear that Mr. Body was murdered in the conservatory with the 
candlestick. 
d. It is obvious that Mr. Body was murdered in the conservatory with 
the candlestick. 
Imagine that the truth is that Mr. Body was murdered in the Bil l iard Room 
with the lead pipe. Intuition suggests us that if Briscoe utters (38a) and later finds 
out that he was wrong, we might reasonably expect him to be mildly surpri sed. 
However, if Briscoe had instead uttered (38d), an observer might reasonably find 
it odd if  he showed only mild surprise when he learned that his analysi s was 
incorrect .  This suggests that "obvious" expresses a higher degree of public 
commitment to a proposition than does "apparent". 
Consider the data that drove Gunlogson to isolate individual commitment 
sets . Her concern was the data shown in (39) : the declarative sentence with 
fal l ing intonation it 's raining, the declarative sentence with ri sing intonation it 's 
raining?, and the interrogative sentence with rising intonation is it raining ? 
(39) a. It ' s  raining. 
b. It ' s  raining? 
c .  Is i t  raining? 
DECLARATIVE FORM, FALLING INTONATION. 
DECLARATIVE FORM, RISING INTONATION . 
INTERROGATIVE FORM, RISING INTONATION. 
Gunlogson notes that with falling intonation, an utterance of it 's raining 
implicates a speaker's commitment to the content of the proposition expressed by 
that sentence, while an utterance of it 's raining ?, with rising intonation, 
implicates commitment on the part of the addressee . This is why, for example, an 
utterance l ike (40) has what might be considered an impol i te implication: Ah, so 
you 've stopped drowning kittens? suggests that the addressee has in fact 
previously drowned kittens. 
(40) Ah, so you 've stopped drowning kittens? 
A significant modification that I have made to Gunlogson ' s  model is that I 
allow utterances to directly influence the commitment sets of indi vidual di scourse 
participants. Gunlogson merely wanted access to individual commitments to 
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define the notion of Contextual Bias, which allowed her to state a condi tion on the 
felicitous utterance of a rising declarative. She notes that a condition on the 
appropriate use of (39b) or (40) is that the context must already be biased toward 
the propositions expressed by it 's raining or you 've stopped drowning kittens by 
virtue of the addressee' s  prior public commitment to them. She achieves this  by 
positing the Contextual B ias Condition, stated descriptively in (4 1 ) . 
(4 1 )  Contextual Bias Condition (Gunlogson 200 1 :6) 
Rising dec1arati ves can only be used as questions in contexts where the 
Addressee is already publicly committed to the proposition expressed. 
The analysis presented here is  not meant to dispute Gunlogson ' s analysis .  
The claim is merely that an accurate description of the semantics of Discourse 
Adjectives require more than the notion of contextual bias. Gunlogson shows that 
ri sing declaratives pattern like interrogatives in allowing a reading in which the 
speaker is understood to be skeptical of the proposition expressed. Fall ing 
declaratives cannot co-occur with overt expressions of skepticism. An example 
she provides to i l lustrate this fact is  given in (42). 
(42) [A & B are looking at a co-worker's much-dented car] 
A: His driving has gotten a lot better. 
B ' s response: 
a. Has it? I don ' t  see much evidence of that. 
b. It has? I don' t  see much evidence of that. 
c. It has. #1 don ' t  see much evidence of that. 
In terms that incorporate vagueness, thi s  can be restated as follows: rising 
intonation signals a degree of commitment to the truth of a proposition that is  less 
than the minimum standard for absolute commitment, while fal l ing intonation 
signals a degree of commitment that is at least as great as that standard. This can 
be translated into a diagnostic for degrees of commitment involved with 
deri vational ly  related Discourse Adverbs, as shown in (43) .  
(43) [Office Gossip maintains that a co-worker' s  driving has recently 
improved. A & B are looking at that co-worker' s  much-dented car, A says 
to B ] :  
a .  Apparently her driving has gotten a lot better, but I 'm  not so  sure 
i t ' s  true. 
b. Evidently her driving has gotten a lot better, but I ' m  not so sure 
i t 's  true. 
c. #Clearly her driving has gotten a lot better, but I 'm not so sure i t ' s 
true. 
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d. #Obviously her driving has gotten a lot better, but I 'm not so  sure 
i t ' s  true. 
The difference in acceptability of these utterances i s  explained through 
consideration of degrees of probability. Specifically, the adverbs derived from 
apparent and evident impose relatively loose standards with respect to the 
minimum degree of probability they tolerate. This allows the speaker to remain 
skeptical of the truth of the proposition expressed by her driving has gotten a lot 
better. Because of this, the assertions with apparently or evidently are compatible 
with overt expressions of doubt, as in (43a,b). 
In contrast, the sentences with clearly and obviously, which impose a 
higher minimum standard of probability, and do not allow such an overt 
expression of doubt. Inconsistency results when sentences with adverbs derived 
from clear and obvious are uttered with a skeptical follow-up. Thus,  clear and 
obvious pattern like falling declaratives in strongly committing the speaker to the 
proposition expressed. 
These points about degrees of commitment lead to the final point to make 
regarding the notion of commitment. This point has to do with the attribution of 
commitment to individual participants in a discourse. As summarized in (44),  
Gunlogson shows that a speaker can use faIling intonation to signal her own 
commitment to the propositional content of an utterance, and a speaker c an use 
RISING intonation to signal commitment on the part of the addressee. 
(44) Attribution of Commitment in Gunlogson 's  Model 
a. The form of a sentence compositionally contributes commitment. 
• DECLARATIVE SENTENCE FORM contributes commitment 
• INTERROGATIVE SENTENCE FORM contributes a lack of 
commitment 
b. The intonational contour of a sentence compositional ly attributes 
commitment to a discourse participant. 
• FALLING INTONATION attributes commitment to the speaker 
• RISING INTONATION attributes commitment to the addressee 
A natural question to ask following this is: how does a speaker signal 
commitment on the part of both herself and the addressee - that is ,  all of the 
di scourse participants - to the propositional content of a declarative sentence? 
There appears to be no intonational contour that serves this function in Engli sh.  
But the analysis presented in this paper shows that Discourse Adjectives fill  thi s 
role in the grammar. The use of a Discourse Adjective in a declarative sentence 
with fal ling intonation is a strategy a speaker can adopt to commit both speaker 
and addressee to the content of a proposition by uttering a single sentence, such as 
the central example of this paper, repeated in (45) .  
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(45) It ' s  clear that Briscoe is  a detective. 
Further, this analysis of Discourse Adjectives combined with Gunlogson' s  
compositional analysis  o f  rising intonation makes a prediction about the meaning 
of an utterance of a declarative sentence with a Discourse Adj ecti ve and rising 
intonation, as in (46).  
(46) It ' s  clear that Briscoe is a detective? 
The prediction is  that an utterance of (46) signals a commitment on the 
part of the addressee to the belief that the interlocutors agree that Bri scoe is a 
detecti ve. This prediction is borne out. The combination of Gunlogson ' s  
Cntextual Bias Condition with the semantics provided here for Discourse 
Adjecti ves, accurately  captures the semantics of (46), as well as the intuition that 
i ts utterance can only be felicitously uttered in a si tuation that is contextual ly  
biased towards both discourse participants already being publicly committed to 
the proposition expressed by (45).  
5. In Conclusion 
This paper has introduced Discourse adjectives, explained their abi lity to seem 
factive, and in so doing has shown that when an assertion of simple clarity is 
accepted in the di scourse model , the interlocutors are licensed to proceed as if the 
designated proposition is  true, if only for the sake of the current discussion. The 
analysis provides empirical support for Stalnaker' s claim that the discourse model 
must contain a representation of the conversation taking place, and Gunlogson' s  
cal l for a finely articulated model of the Common Ground that di stinguishes 
between the public commitments of the speaker and addressee. It should be 
noted, however, that the implementation presented here may go beyond what 
either of these researchers originally intended. Finally, as for Discourse 
Adjectives themselves, they have been shown to be a unique type of predicate. 
Their context-update effect is entirely metal inguistic .  They provide interlocutors 
with a means of speaking directly about their conversation, which allows for the 
synchronization of the Common Ground in a di scourse. 
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